Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2025

 

 

 

 

 

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, and Karolina Hird

June 25, 2025, 7 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine — consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states. A reporter asked Trump during a press conference at the NATO summit on June 25 whether it is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin has territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine, and Trump responded that "it's possible."[1] ISW has long assessed that Russia is preparing its military and society for a possible future conflict with NATO following the conclusion of the war in Ukraine, including by pursuing military reforms; integrating veterans into all levels of Russian local, regional, and federal governments; and setting rhetorical conditions to justify future aggression against NATO.[2] ISW has observed the Kremlin leverage the same rhetoric that it used against Ukraine before the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 to threaten NATO states.[3] The Kremlin has also specifically weaponized the concept of "compatriots abroad" — Russian-speaking populations living outside of Russia, whom Russia claims it needs to protect—to justify aggression against former Soviet states in the past.[4] The Kremlin has also promoted its concept of "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") — an amorphous ideological and geographic conception that includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation and which Putin uses to frame any territories a Russian regime ruled or claimed to have ruled as Russia's "historical territories."[5] The Kremlin has been setting informational conditions to justify potential aggression against Moldova and the Baltic states using the alleged need to protect its "compatriots abroad" and the claim that these countries are part of the "Russkiy Mir" — the same narratives that the Kremlin used to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[6] Trump's statements therefore, cohere with ISW's fundamental assessment that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine and will continue pursuing these ambitions unless Putin is forced to reconsider his theory of victory.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations. Rubio stated in an interview with Politico published on June 25 that Russia is trying to "achieve on the battlefield what [Russia is] demanding at the negotiating table" including "control over certain territories," but noted that this objective will be more difficult to achieve than Russia currently believes.[7] Rubio stated that Russia has suffered over 80,000 killed-in-action (KIA) since January 2025 but that Putin nevertheless continues "feeding into the war machine" and that Russia has "not shown a willingness to move forward" in peace negotiations. Rubio's statements are consistent with ISW's assessments that Russia has been attempting to delay the negotiation process and protract the war in order to secure additional territorial gains.[8] Russia's maximalist negotiating demands for Ukrainian territory, including significant amounts of territory that Russia does not currently occupy, represent an informational tactic intended to force territorial concessions to compensate for gains that Russia cannot achieve on the battlefield. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unwilling to engage in substantive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in any way that falls short of acquiescing to Russia's maximalist demands, which have remained consistent since before the start of the full-scale invasion.[9]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 25 on his social media accounts, including his English-language channels, that the EU is becoming a politicized, "Russophobic organization...that dreams of revenge against Russia."[10] Medvedev further accused the EU of becoming a militarized bloc that presents just as prominent a threat to Russia as NATO does, claiming that "Brussels today is Russia's true enemy" for arming Ukraine. Medvedev claimed that Ukrainian accession into the EU would endanger Russia and implied that Russia could destroy all of Ukraine to prevent this outcome. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage Western provisions of aid to Ukraine.[11] Kremlin officials and affiliates have repeatedly promoted narratives that the EU is essentially a military organization like NATO.[12] The Kremlin most recently activated Medvedev to project nuclear proliferation threats following US strikes on Iran's nuclear program.[13] Medvedev's recent comments do not represent a serious rhetorical inflection, but rather a continuation of the Kremlin's informational campaign to undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Russian officials are promoting purposefully vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on June 24 that the "root causes" of the war are the alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO violations of its obligations to not expand closer to Russia, including claimed NATO plans to build bases in Crimea and British plans to build a base on the Sea of Azov.[14] Lavrov previously claimed in an interview in December 2024 that the two main "root causes" of the war are NATO's alleged violation of obligations to not advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[15] Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded in recent months that any settlement to the war must "eliminate the root causes," but Lavrov's June 24 claim that these root causes include alleged NATO and UK plans to build bases in Crimea and along the Sea of Azov is unusually specific and likely aimed at further deterring Western support for Ukraine and portraying NATO as a threat to Russia.[16] The ambiguity of what Russian officials constitute as "root causes" of the war allows the Kremlin the flexibility to add specificity when it chooses and to adapt its demands of Ukraine in any potential peace settlement in the future.

Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that Russia's state-owned Votkinsk Plant has hired 2,500 workers, built new facilities, and imported specialized manufacturing equipment as part of efforts to expand Russia's production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, Yars and Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and likely Oreshnik ballistic missiles since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[17] The Kyiv Independent stated that an analysis of the plant's internal business operations shows that the plant sourced manufacturing equipment from companies in the PRC, Taiwan, and Belarus via private Russian intermediaries. The Kyiv Independent stated that it is unclear how many ICBMs the Votkinsk Plant is currently producing, but noted that internal documents indicate that Russia is investing in its ICBM arsenal and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) ordered the Votkinsk Plant in March 2022 to fulfill a production contract for $13 million worth of parts for the Bulava ICBM by 2024. A senior official from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told the Kyiv Independent that Russia is preparing for a long war and is stockpiling various types of missiles. The Kyiv Independent, citing the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), stated that Russia increased its production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from 250 in 2023 to 700 in 2024 and noted that its GUR source agreed with RUSI's assessment. The Kyiv Independent reported that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025, indicating that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia maintain its current pace of strikes against Ukraine. ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia is actively expanding and stockpiling its production of T-90M tanks, and Russia's expansion and acceleration of missile production capacity further supports ISW's assessment that Russia is working to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and a potential expanded future conflict with NATO.[18]

The United States signaled receptiveness to provisioning Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems—a particularly salient issue given reports of Russia's increased ballistic missile production. US President Donald Trump responded to a question during the NATO summit on June 25 on whether the United States planned to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems by stating that the United States would "see if they can make some available."[19] US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia increases its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's limited Patriot air defense systems are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect.[20]

NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine. The NATO heads of state and government participating in the NATO summit in The Hague published a joint declaration on June 25.[21] The declaration reaffirmed NATO's commitment to collective defense, as defined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and committed to investing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually in core defense requirements and defense- and security-related spending by 2035. The declaration also reaffirmed NATO's commitment to supporting Ukraine and that NATO members will include direct contributions to Ukraine's defense and defense industry in their spending calculations. The declaration highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte told reporters on June 25 that NATO faces a long-term threat from Russia, especially because North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran are supporting Russia's war effort against Ukraine, and that NATO must increase its defense spending.[22] Rutte emphasized in his plenary speech at the NATO summit the importance of Article 5 and the commitment to invest five percent of GDP into defense, stating that NATO will need to expand its DIB on both sides of the Atlantic.[23] US President Donald Trump told reporters at the NATO summit that the United States is committed to Article 5.[24] A large group consisting of members of the European Parliament, members of national parliaments, politicians, diplomats, military personnel, and subject matter experts sent an open letter to the heads of NATO countries calling for support of Ukraine, including calling for increased aid and air defense.[25]

Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Norwegian government announced on June 24 that it will allocate 6.5 billion Norwegian kroner (about $642 million) to drone procurement for Ukrainian forces from Ukrainian and European manufacturers.[26] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen signed a letter of intent on June 24 to begin efforts to establish the joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Denmark.[27] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Danish government allocated 500 million Danish kroner (about $78 million) to accelerate Ukrainian weapon production. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide a new package of 350 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAMs), financed for the first time using £70 million (about $96 million) of funding from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework.[28] Starmer announced that UK Armed Forces engineers had adapted the ASRAAM missiles to be compatible with Ukraine's UK-supplied RAVEN ground-based air defense systems. Starmer stated that the UK will imminently deliver five new RAVEN air defense systems, bringing the total that Ukraine has to 13 systems.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Atlant-Aero plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[29] Kovalenko reported that the Atlant-Aero plant specializes in producing critical Russian combat drone components and control systems, including “Orion” drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and digital integration for first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions. Russian sources posted footage of explosions in Taganrog and claimed that Russian air defenses repelled a drone strike near Taganrog and other areas of Rostov Oblast overnight.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine – consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials are promoting purposefully vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit.
• Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Velyka Novosilka, and Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 25.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 24 and 25.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 25 that Ukrainian forces attacked in the Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) directions, including near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 25 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the H-07 Sumy City-Sudzha highway east of Pysarivka (north of Sumy City) but that Russian forces had to withdraw from the area for unspecified reasons.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Yablunivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on June 24 and 25.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Khotin (north of Sumy City) and Yunakivka.[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly participated in the claimed seizure of Yablunivka, and elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating south of the settlement.[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 and 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northern and northwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 24 and 25.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[39] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are within one kilometer of Kupyansk.[40] ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced as close as 3.4 kilometers of Kupyansk's northern administrative boundary as of June 25.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka and toward Dovhenke; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Dvorichanske (both near the international border); east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane and Kurylivka on June 24 and 25.[41]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces routinely conduct infantry attacks against Ukrainian positions in small fireteams of one to three soldiers and are using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) for motorized assaults instead of armored vehicles.[42] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to cross the Oskil River.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[43] Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating on the northern outskirts of Holubivka.[44]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova) and likely liberated the settlement.[45]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced west of Serhiivka (east of Borova) and north and west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky, Nadiya, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka on June 24 and 25.[47]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Zelenyi Hai.[48]

Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced north of Lyman on June 24.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that it launched a successful counterattack against elements of the Russian 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) and advanced near Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[49] The Ukrainian brigade reported that the counterattack "destroyed" a platoon of the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) and north of Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[50]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and Ridkodub and toward Novyi Myr and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on June 24 and 25.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lypove (north of Lyman).[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are assaulting Ukrainian positions in small groups of two to three soldiers, often without helmets.[53] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are using KAB glide bombs, fiber optic drones, and a large number of first-person view (FPV) drones alongside assaults in an effort to advance in this direction.[54] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are committing untrained soldiers to assaults alongside more experienced soldiers and that Russian forces are currently conducting infantry-led assaults due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian drones and land mines in destroying Russian vehicles. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are actively using fiber optic drones in the Serebryanske forest.[55]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division and "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Kolodyazi.[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 24 and 25.[57] A servicemember with a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces continue to attack with small assault groups while conducting artillery, glide bomb, and drone strikes.[58] The Ukrainian servicemember noted that Russian forces continue to rely on light equipment, including all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), motorcycles, and buggies. The Ukrainian servicemember reported that Russian forces are accumulating forces in occupied Siverskodonetsk (formerly Severodonetsk) and Lysychansk (both east of Siversk) for attacks in the Siversk direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on June 24 and 25.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the industrial area near the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka, Pleshchiivka, and Yablunivka and toward Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove on June 24 and 25.[61]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that the contested "gray zone" near Toretsk has widened due to Russia's pervasive use of fiber-optic drones against Ukrainian logistics in the area.[62] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces primarily provide logistical support to frontline positions by dropping supplies with aerial drones because Ukrainian drones target Russian vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have entered Oleksandro-Kalynove but cannot establish a foothold within the settlement.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in Yablunivka.[64] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[65]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk) and in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and northeast of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[67] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north, south, and southeast of Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Koptieve, Razine, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on June 24 and 25.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Myrne, and drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade's "Kaira" Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Skakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[70] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows Russian servicemembers raising a flag in central Yalta (south of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[72] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) seized the settlement.[73]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Yalta, southwest of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), and west of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Novopavlivka toward Chuhuieve; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka, Horikhove, Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Fedorivka, Zaporizhzhia, Vesele, and Komar on June 24 and 25.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Yalta and near Fedorivka and Perebudova (south of Novopavlivka).[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Perebudova (south of Novopavlivka).[77] Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Novoserhiivka.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrne (south of Novopavlivka), and drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka.[79]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[80]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Zelene Pole on June 24 and 25.[81]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 25 but did not advance.[82]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking targets near Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[83]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka and near Kamyanske on June 24 and 25.[84]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to the VDV) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[85] Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Luhivske (southeast of Orikhiv).[86]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 25 but did not advance.[87]

Ukrainian forces may have conducted a strike against a Russian command post in occupied Crimea overnight on June 23 to 24. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the command staff building of a naval detachment of the Russian 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) in occupied Crimea with two Neptune anti-ship missiles.[88] The milbloggers claimed that the detachment evacuated the building after receiving intelligence on June 22 ahead of the strike, and that the Ukrainian strike only damaged an empty command staff building and the house of former Hispaniola commander Stanislav Orlov. One milblogger published footage of a fire at a compound.[89] ISW is unable to confirm these reports. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian officials have commented on the possible Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 24 and 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 71 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[90] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 32 Shahed drones and that 20 were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Odesa, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv oblasts and damaged civilian infrastructure.[91]

The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assembly and training ground at the Kramatorsk Airfield in Donetsk Oblast using Shahed drones.[92] ISW has recently observed reports that Russian forces are increasingly using long-range Shahed drones to strike areas closer to the frontline in addition to deep rear areas.[93]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s missile strike against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 24 killed 21 civilians and injured over 300.[94]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces have launched a total of 28,743 Shahed drones against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and 2,736 Shahed drones in June 2025 alone.[95]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus and Russia continue to deepen nuclear energy cooperation through the Union State framework. Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin met with Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Director Alexei Likhachev in Minsk on June 25 and discussed broadening bilateral cooperation in nuclear energy development.[96]

Belarus continues to develop closer military relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin met with PRC Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun in Qingdao on June 25 and discussed deepening bilateral and multilateral military cooperation, including within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).[97]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/25/its-possible-putin-will-invade-more-than-ukraine-says-donald-trump; https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-says-putin-may-ambitions-154357969.html

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061825 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2024

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[7] https://www.politico.com/video/2025/06/25/exclusive-marco-rubio-sits-down-with-politico-at-nato-summit-1668156; https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/25/trump-rubio-sanctions-russia-nato-00422668; https://suspilne dot media/1051179-rubio-rozpoviv-comu-tramp-ne-pospisae-zaprovadzuvati-sankcii-proti-rf/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825;

[10] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/594 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/84

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062225

[14] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2030626/

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525

[17] https://kyivindependent dot com/investigation-russia-expands-strategic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help/

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025

[19] https://archive.ph/CjHo4 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/us/politics/trump-ukraine-patriot-missiles-zelensky.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/25/us/politics/trump-ukraine-patriot-missiles-zelensky.html

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025

[21] https://www.nato.int/cps/ge/natohq/official_texts_236705.htm?selectedLocale=en

[22] https://www.youtube.com/live/l8A2ggDq3Ek ; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236431.htm

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfLmlrXqSwo ; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_236497.htm?selectedLocale=en

[24] https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/jun/25/nato-donald-trump-mark-rutte-europe-latest-live-news?CMP=share_btn_url&page=with%3Ablock-685bb3f08f08cff83135b673#block-685bb3f08f08cff83135b673; https://suspilne dot media/1051289-tramp-pidtverdiv-prihilnist-ssa-do-5-statti-nato/

[25] https://x.com/RihardsKols/status/1937456127240786275?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1937456127240786275%7Ctwgr%5E57065fbf89207b9bb70294f7a27dbfbd3cca9f5b%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F1051267-u-lideriv-krain-nato-vimagaut-pocati-diati-i-aktivnise-dopomagati-ukraini%2F; https://suspilne dot media/1051267-u-lideriv-krain-nato-vimagaut-pocati-diati-i-aktivnise-dopomagati-ukraini/

[26] https://www.regjeringen dot no/en/aktuelt/norway-to-provide-nok-6.5-billion-for-procurement-of-drones-for-ukraine/id3111763/

[27] https://mod.gov dot ua/en/news/ukraine-and-denmark-have-signed-an-agreement-to-establish-ukrainian-defense-production-in-denmark; https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid035gkaDmrZW89GuPgffjpSEJrzxcU3VnEhHK5wnvi1TTdnjArxeU89gdtBdQa1DPM7l?locale=ru_RU; https://suspilne dot media/1050697-ukraina-i-dania-pidpisali-list-pro-spilne-virobnictvo-zbroi/

[28] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-provide-hundreds-of-air-defence-missiles-for-ukraine-with-money-from-seized-russian-assets ; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/24/keir-starmer-to-give-missiles-to-ukraine-paid-for-with-70m-interest-on-russian-assets

[29] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9450 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/u-taganrozi-atakovano-vazhlyvyj-vuzol-rosijskogo-vpk/

[30] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/2610; https://t.me/tass_agency/322325; https://t.me/dva_majors/74113 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30824 ; https://t.me/astrapress/84842 ; https://t.me/currenttime/47091; https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/mestnye-vlasti-zayavili-o-pozhare-na-stadione-v-taganroge/33454206.html

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/27485; https://t.me/dva_majors/74113; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30431

[33] https://t.me/yurasumy/23692

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852; https://t.me/dva_majors/74113; https://t.me/yurasumy/23692; https://t.me/tass_agency/322344; https://t.me/wargonzo/27485

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/74113; https://t.me/yurasumy/23692 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/46321 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/45541

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30419; https://t.me/milinfolive/151791

[37] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29177; https://t.me/vovkodavy34/36; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9464; https://t.me/osirskiy/1195

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15251

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/74113 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37678

[40] https://t.me/tass_agency/322351

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74113

[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/shturmovi-grupy-z-odnogo-pihotynczya-na-harkivshhyni-rosijski-oficzery-prodovzhuyut-utylizuvaty-svoyih-soldativ/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xo_b3bOvMG4

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94470 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/17025

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37678

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9462; https://t.me/c/2450506683/1153

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30444 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37704

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37704

[49] ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/the-3rd-assault-brigade-eliminated-invader-platoon-near-ridkodub-village/

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30444

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30444 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65414 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65414

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30444

[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/shturm-bez-kasky-na-lymanshhyni-okupanty-jdut-u-bij-bez-shansiv-na-vyzhyvannya/ ; https://www.facebook.com/66ombr/videos/713521851400153/?rdid=1ozFYFzfGs8Lb5NK

[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/nepidgotovlenyj-soldatik-ne-bude-bigty-poblyzu-lymana-pozycziyi-syl-oborony-atakuyut-dva-pidvydy-shturmovykiv/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65414

[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170260

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761

[58] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/protyvnyk-peretvoryv-okupovani-mista-na-oporni-punkty-nasha-rozvidka/

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27485

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30419

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761; https://t.me/yurasumy/23715

[62] https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/25/shvydshe-doyihaty-do-okolycz-a-dali-pishohid-u-zhorstokyh-boyah-v-toreczku-berut-uchast-lyshe-lyudy-i-drony/

[63] https://t.me/yurasumy/23715

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/74099

[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/54144

[66] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29186; https://www.tiktok.com/@andrey96tokio5/video/7519195065152032056?is_from_webapp=1; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9465; https://t.me/osirskiy/1195

[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65420; https://t.me/wargonzo/27485

[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37711

[69] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37686 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74113

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37711; https://t.me/voin_dv/15664

[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/74129; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37713

[72] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1937800864401629538; https://t.me/voin_dv/15663; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9460; https://t.me/osintpen/1290

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/54141; https://t.me/mod_russia/54136; https://t.me/mod_russia/54133

[74] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31899; https://t.me/wargonzo/27485; https://t.me/yurasumy/23710 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23711

[75] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890

[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/74113

[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30430

[78] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37686

[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/15659; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13964

[80] https://x.com/lostarmour/status/1937174606609084861; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1937746055522607204

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12761; https://t.me/wargonzo/27485; https://t.me/dva_majors/74113

[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0f7nCHpcVQfSmXWmZuJaLWPZexEwBuxzUBwngQ2aWnysfjf9VsuhpU4E4RPbs7HBal

[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/15666

[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25890; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25852 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0f7nCHpcVQfSmXWmZuJaLWPZexEwBuxzUBwngQ2aWnysfjf9VsuhpU4E4RPbs7HBal

[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30419; https://t.me/dva_majors/74119; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7250

[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/15658

[87] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0f7nCHpcVQfSmXWmZuJaLWPZexEwBuxzUBwngQ2aWnysfjf9VsuhpU4E4RPbs7HBal; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25855

[88] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94457; https://t.me/dva_majors/74083; https://t.me/dva_majors/74084; https://t.me/zhivoff/21508; https://t.me/dva_majors/74090; https://t.me/rybar/71635

[89] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94457

[90] https://t.me/kpszsu/37024

[91] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23682; https://t.me/synegubov/15249; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/15218; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1050861-drugu-nic-pospil-rosiani-atakuvali-harkiv-simoma-bezpilotnikami-e-poranenij/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15248 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15251 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2726 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0f7nCHpcVQfSmXWmZuJaLWPZexEwBuxzUBwngQ2aWnysfjf9VsuhpU4E4RPbs7HBal ; https://www.facebook.com/izmail.rda/posts/pfbid0MobMQHpo3mSM7r1nsM1GqVKChvYtHXt8xLBbj4VWptuKK84mg87EeR9HmXVKDe4gl; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1050825-izmailskij-rajon-atakovano-dronami-rf-pid-udarom-bula-infrastruktura-vilkovogo/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10224 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/vorozhi-drony-atakuvaly-izmayilskyj-rajon-odeshhyny-poshkodzhena-czyvilna-infrastruktura/ ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/21144; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1050829-armia-rf-vnoci-atakuvala-zaporizza-e-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14853

[92] https://t.me/mod_russia/54130 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170266 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30411 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30427 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30411 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30427

[93] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125

[94] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/43008 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/24/na-dnipropetrovshhyni-vnaslidok-rosijskoyi-ataky-postrazhdaly-ponad-200-lyudej-17-zagynuly/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/25/u-dnipri-zrosla-kilkist-zhertv-rosijskogo-teraktu-24-chervnya/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22445 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1050089-vijska-rf-masovano-atakuvali-dnipropetrovsinu-poskodzenna-u-dnipri-ta-u-samaru-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/; https://suspilne dot media/1050741-rf-masovano-atakuvala-dnipro-raketami-24-cervna-suspilne-videonovini/

[95] https://youtu.be/MWLdwwm5d7k; https://suspilne dot media/1050645-v-cervni-rosia-zapustila-po-ukraini-2736-droniv-tipu-shahed-zelenskij/

[96] https://belta dot by/society/view/turchin-belarus-i-rosatom-sotrudnichajut-po-shirokomu-spektru-napravlenij-722850-2025/

[97] https://t.me/modmilby/48609